Art as Tyranny: Nietzsche vs. Clement of Alexandria
I. The Modern Art World as Symptom
I have spent enough time in the world of art, media, and underground subculture to know the strange little vanity and status games that go on therein. Who’s who? Styles come and go– names and faces are quickly forgotten, but it’s very essential to exhibit “teeth and palms” in order to maintain relations; without relations, the whisperings of what or where is next won’t be heard. You can think of this world as a pressure cooker upstream of all other pop cultural developments: whatever has become mainstream is likely born out of this world of fashion and is passé by daybreak. The ability to be understood by those outside this world is part of what sullies a thing, therefore this world is initiatory and gnostic by nature–you can’t muscle your way in. Either you know or you don’t, and if you know you know, and you can’t know what you don’t, and no one likes a(n) (obvious) striver. In this world something’s hot til it’s not. It is a place of inversion; rich kids pretend they’re poor, poor kids pretend they’re rich; all of them apparently can afford the luxury of concern for mere ornament. Everything in this world is valued by the ineffable ‘coolness’ of a thing, an idea strangely indefinable to its most fanatical proselytes. Trying to be cool, for example, is not cool. But so is trying too hard to not try. Are you dizzy yet, reader? For some this inversion is experienced as a rush– “it’s in vogue to be feckless.” There’s a uniquely pagan pathology dominating this world– the art world. This modern art world behaves as if illusion, power, and perspectival imposition are intrinsic to art — and as if this were not only unavoidable, but virtuous. There is, after all, a great deal of magnetic power in being the person to have broached a seemingly new wave of being, expression, style. Copycats are seemingly second tier, borrowing their being from the being they imitate in a sort of pagan worship. To be a ‘poser’ or someone inauthentically engaged is a social death sentence. Cultural power, then, is all too real a power. In this world and worldview, art is treated as a replacement for truth, religion, and meaning. This modern posture toward art finds its clearest philosophical defense in Nietzsche.
II. Nietzsche’s View of Art and Truth
For Nietzsche, illusion is necessary because truth is destructive to life. Simply put:
“We have art in order not to perish from the truth.”
(The Will to Power, §822)
But how can art prevent one from perishing from the truth? It does this through the creation of illusion, the providing of meaning-making frameworks that allow the individual to feel inspired to live for some purpose. In this way, art serves a mythological or religious purpose, providing meaning where an objective survey of reality (like in the materialist or empiricist perspective) leaves one with a great deal of data but no real reason why. Therefore art, by virtue of its ability to produce an illusion of meaning, replaces religion:
“Art raises its head where religions decline. It takes over many feelings and moods produced by religion and deepens them.”
(Human, All Too Human, §150)
This is obvious when we survey the youth, a demographic dominating the flow of culture in America. America idolizes youth, and is consistently fascinated by what the young find interesting. The young, possessing still a certain impulsiveness and lust for life, are uninterested in the somber gravity of reality– that all must die, that entropy is inevitable, that moral seriousness is demanded by life– and instead are interested and at large encouraged by the culture producing them to “live while you still can.” The youth, possessing no experience from which to draw discernment, hoping life is what they hope it to be, are all too happy to oblige this market demand to “eat, drink, and be merry.” Vitality and ecstasy are then the chief components of this religious disposition a la the Dionysian state of frenzy. If then the ornaments of culture are inspired by the feeling and moods of the artist, and the artist is simply the magnetic person whom the youth have lauded as a sort of avatar of their collective spirit, then a feedback loop is produced in which cultural artifacts are continually churned out by the inspiration of former artifacts– illusions produce illusions in an endless cycle. Nietzsche would not have it any other way, seeing as “[t]here are no facts, only interpretations” in his view. In this case, art’s illusion-generating nature is precisely what is most laudable about it, functioning as a sort of will-to-power:
“What is good?—All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man.”
(The Antichrist, §2)
Nietzsche holds that art is a redemptive falsification that transfigures suffering, intensifies power, and justifies existence when truth alone would crush us. This illusion, then, would seem biologically necessary in his view, the truth being oppressive and nihilistic. In this view, art is what sets man free to be self-determined, acting as a medium for identity and meaning-generation. Art, rather than something tyrannical, is an antidote to what Nietzsche sees as a tyrannical insistence on moralism, asceticism, and fanatic devotion to truth at all costs. Art for Nietzsche is seen as humanity’s highest achievement and a sign of great health.
III. Nietzsche’s Internal Contradictions: Life, Illusion, Arbitrary Hierarchy
However, upon critique, some of Nietzsche’s assumptions begin to collapse. First, he assumes life itself is the ultimate value, but then makes an arbitrary differentiation all throughout his work between what he terms the uber and untermensch, the over- and underman, high- versus low-life forms respectively. In one case, the life of the ubermensch is worth the sacrifice of a certain self-determined set of values, but in the other case the underman or “bugman” is seen as morally inferior by virtue of his clinging to certain values for the sake of mere survival. Within the context of Nietzsche’s system he gives an explanation of why one is to be valued over the other, but we can’t help but to subject him to his own critique that this is merely a subjective stance, clinging to a subjective illusion of superiority determined by the man himself. Nietzsche’s ranking of higher and lower humans is itself a moral evaluation. Yet he denies any non-illusory moral standpoint from which such evaluations could be true rather than merely expressive of personal will.
Next he assumes illusion is necessary and truth destructive– all while denying any such truth exists. How then are we capable of making universal claims like “truth is ___” and “illusions are ___,” as both would signal an assumption that we can make universal claims?
Consequently, how can we assert illusion to be life-strengthening? For example, the untermensch may possess the (according to Nietzsche) illusory belief that he is greater than the ubermensch for such and such reason. In that case, would not the illusion serve to affirm his life? Or are there right and wrong illusions to possess? Because it would appear in Nietzsche’s view that morality itself is an illusion, and one that the untermensch clings to at their peril. But then is the superiority of the ubermensch a truth of reality we must accept?
But let us agree with Nietzsche and accept that illusion is a necessary component of art; why then do we jump to assume this illusion is benign? Even if art does intensify certain modes of life, why assume it does not tyrannize perception? In response, I find Clement of Alexandria to offer an account of art that directly contradicts Nietzsche’s moral interpretation of art, illusion, and power.
IV. Clement of Alexandria: Art as Seductive Tyranny
Clement’s metaphysics could perhaps not be more completely opposed to Nietzsche’s, which makes a comparison of the two elucidating. For Clement, there could perhaps be some agreement with Nietzsche regarding art’s falsifying capability. Art is the seducer of perception, competing with truth, clothing matter in a veneer which promotes the worship of things which themselves are not worthy of worship. The force of art is so totalizing on the senses of fallen man that it could rightly be thought of as tyrannical. Art, then, either explicitly or imperceptibly leads the soul away from God and reality.
In the words of Clement:
But it was the eyes of the spectators that were deceived by art; for no one in his senses ever would have embraced a goddess, or entombed himself with a lifeless paramour, or become enamored of a demon and a stone. But it is with a different kind of spell that art deludes you, if it leads you not to the indulgence of amorous affections: it leads you to pay religious honor and worship to images and pictures.
Let it be understood that although images are explicitly mentioned, it is not hard to see how this applies to all mediums; whether weaving, metallurgy, music, dance, light in the form of film, photograph, etc., the aim of which is to beautify the created thing for the sake of some perspectival imposition. “Let this appear this way,” is the essential thrust of any artist when setting out to create. Do we say art is inherently wicked? No. We only intend to suggest that art, by its very nature, is so frighteningly capable of lulling our perspective into a pagan worship of creatures, or, when oriented correctly, toward worship of the totally transcendent Creator.
“So powerful is art to delude, by seducing amorous men into the pit. Art is powerful, but it cannot deceive reason, nor those who live agreeably to reason.
Let art receive its meet of praise, but let it not deceive man by passing itself off for truth… Let not art contend against nature; that is, let not falsehood strive with truth.
Are not all these things which you look on the progeny of one mother– the earth? Why then, foolish men (for I will repeat it), have you, defaming the supercelestial region, dragged religion to the ground, by fashioning to yourselves gods of earth, and by going after those created objects, instead of the uncreated Deity, have sunk into the deepest darkness?
Matter always needs art to fashion it, but the deity needs nothing. Art has come forward to do its work, and the matter is clothed with its shape: and while the preciousness of the material makes it capable of being turned to profitable account, it is only on account of its form that it comes to be deemed worthy of veneration… But I have been in the habit of walking on the earth, not worshipping it.”
And so we must not understand Clement as being here essentially iconoclastic. Writing is, after all, an art form, a means by which one can either point to worship of the Creator within which all things “live and subsist and have their being,” or rather by fanciful inversion impose a perspective which is illusory, causing desire for that which is contrary to reason, nature, and truth. Art then, in spite of the intentions of its fashioner, cannot help but fall to one or the other bias– there is no sense in which neutral ornamentation can take place in its effects on perception and desire. Art, if not directed toward what is true, acts as a rival legislation over how reality is seen. Not only is this consonant with Nietzsche’s view of art as illusion-producing, but it exceeds him in terms of internal coherence as a theory.
V. Art as Necessary Tyranny
And so stated plainly, we could be summarized as saying:
All art imposes a privileged perspective.
All imposed perspective constrains perception.
All perceptual constraints are tyrannical in structure, even when benevolent.
For example: observe the so-called artistic geniuses of each age– how many of them have resembled dictators? How many times have you witnessed a maestro share the podium? The beauty of a piece comes from its adherence to the original idea of the person whose perception is captured– how can, aside from divine intervention, two perfectly communicate between themselves the same idea with precision? For either one or the other adds or takes away, or for fear of himself appearing a tyrant, compromises the idea for the sake of mutual understanding. But if art is the display of an idea through medium, and the skill of the artist is dependent on their ability to excavate the idea into an observable form, how else could this be achieved except through constraint and singularity of perspective? “See it in precisely this way.”
One technique of coercion is “visual weight” or the technique of positioning elements in such a way so as to guide the eye of the viewer to focus in on a specific part, or to move their attention along a certain axis. Even if the viewer is aware and attempts to circumvent this, looking where the artist has not intended, avoiding all eye contact with that which the tyrant intends, the viewer will only further confirm the artist’s tyranny by virtue of their resistance to succumbing to that which is imposed. For nothing so solidifies the tyrant’s authority as impotent resistance.
Even when a piece intends to leave interpretation open-ended, the viewer cannot help but be brought in to focus upon a specific referent that requires interpretation. “Interpret this for yourself,” the artist commands. This is even more obvious the more staunchly we oppose the imposed perspective. Even the tyrant, self-conscious of this fact, who tries to circumvent it by using the form in some experimental fashion, only reinforces her tyranny further. Take John Cage’s 4’33” for example. In this piece, the composer sits at a piano and proceeds to sit in silence. The purpose is to force the audience to reckon with the absence of musical imposition. Even when the natural elements of the theatre flood in at the piano’s absence– the a/c whirring, the gentleman’s cough, the stifled muttering of confused participants, chirping birds, the muffled fart– all flood in not because of their overpowering, but by the tyrant’s allowance. And so even the tyrant, having seized the means of power– the art form itself– is impotent to extirpate from art its necessarily tyrannical nature. Even in the case of so-called “collective art” in which all are thought to in some way equally contribute– is not the mob more tyrannical than the individual? Indeed, individuality is wholly subsumed in this form of tyranny. Each personality is swallowed up by the collective psychopathology of the mob– it only exists insofar as it serves the tyrannical spirit.
Jazz, it may be argued, is a subversive, democratic art form. But this mistakes the interplay of the very experienced– experts– for pure non-tyrannical play, when it is in fact the highest form of imposition. To possess such control that your breaking the rules is seen as a radical new interpretation of the form is itself very tyrannical. Forcing disgust from those who hate jazz, and causing connoisseurs to admire even the most dissonant rattling is itself a radical display of power and the imposition of one’s perspective. What artist is so humble that they would not seek recognition? What artist does not burn with envy at the thought that another may surpass them? If they did not seek recognition, they would not create at all.
And why does a form like jazz produce such a visceral reaction? Is it not because of its explicit insistence that a little bit of randomness, Dionysian abandon, should impede stodgy Apollonian insistence on order every now and then? When a layperson critiques jazz in disgust as aberrant noisemaking, are they not making a political statement? What is art if not political? What is politics if not grasping after the implements of this world, which is said to be “passing away”? Here again we are faced with a certain irony: Nietzsche, in his clinging to the world and its illusions, finds his successors in both staunch Left and Right-wing postmodernists, themselves obsessed with nothing but power and aesthetics and a total disregard for truth, much in every way like their teacher. One may protest and say Christianity, too, possesses its modern day Left/Right successors, but not without internal contradictions obviously invalidating one or the other interpretation of its tradition. In the case of Nietzsche and Nietzscheans, self-contradiction is very orthodoxically Nietzschean!
But I digress. In summary, the artist cannot avoid the tyranny of art itself. Even anti-authoritarianism has its dogmas, and even that which is intended for open-endedness enforces structure. Art, then, is inherently legislative over perception.
VI. Nietzsche vs Clement: Truth, Perspectivism, and Epistemological Chaos
And so, with Nietzsche we see an explicit statement of the disposition of those frenzied children of pride inhabiting the art world we described in the beginning: a) illusion is necessary for survival, to which truth is subordinate, b) power is life and life is power– simple as, and c) perspectivism is unavoidable, and one is free to select whichever perspective best suits their tastes.
With Clement of Alexandria, a) we admit art is illusion producing, but also that it is spiritually dangerous, b) that truth is ontologically prior to what Nietzsche presupposes, c) power as perception or power over perception corrupts our perceptual faculties, d) such a seduction of the rational soul’s senses enslaves the soul.
In short, Nietzsche correctly diagnoses what the art kids knew already, subconsciously: art is illusion and illusion is power. Clement, conversely, correctly diagnoses illusion and power as tyrannical and spiritually corrosive– a fact some find out far too late.
The demand of the Christian approach then is an exclusive devotion to truth, at the expense of a multiplicity of perspectives. Nietzsche’s perspectivism in which there are “no facts, only interpretations” privileges multiplicity as somehow having a higher (albeit necessarily remote) claim to objectivity. But again, why must we assume that these multiple perspectives are all converging on truth? This is akin to the dialectical error in which we assume that the correct answer must necessarily sit at the center of polar opposites. Why shouldn’t we assume this great multitude of perceptions are, as Nietzsche himself asserts, illusions and therefore falsehoods? Nietzsche’s epistemology seems then to be a polytheistic one. Polytheistic ontology famously produces an insurmountable epistemological chaos. In Clement, the solution seems to be to posit that truth is not merely perspectival, that reality is not negotiated on the basis of power alone, and that art is a medium which must submit to truth with no competition between the two.
VIII. Conclusion
In the art world, there is an unspoken assumption that what is inaccessible and incomprehensible to the common masses– high art– is that which most sublimely captures and conveys what is most beautiful in the human soul with an almost unapproachable realness, exhibiting the unforgiving disparity between beauty and ugliness. These works, it would appear, resonate with human faculties so lofty and exclusive so as to appear alien to the majority of mortal men– they cannot understand it and do not recognize the value in it, as it is only recognizable to him who is great of soul. This assumption may offer an explanation for Nietzsche's rejection of Christianity and subsequent postmortem popularity. Indeed, he who spoke so scathingly, with eloquent clarity, against ressentiment could only have done so with such precision by virtue of his familiarity with this basest of all banal malices. The petty grudge of one embittered at being overlooked despite his genius is a well established fact of his biography. Like many in the art world, his failure to achieve recognition seemingly drove him mad, inspiring him to craft his own illusion to save him from the truth. At times I pity poor Nietzsche. Were it not for his hatred of truth and beauty, I might have ranked him higher in terms of genius. Alas, great artists rarely make great philosophers– rarer still do they make great men.
